February 19, 2026

by AEA in News

Strategic Pivot: Greece Formalizes Offshore Exploration Agreements with Chevron and HELLENiQ Energy

Greece is signaling a decisive shift toward “energy realism” as the Ministry of Environment and Energy formalizes major concession agreements for hydrocarbon exploration. Minister Stavros Papastavrou announced the signing of deals with a consortium led by U.S. major Chevron (70%) and HELLENiQ Energy (30%), covering four offshore blocks.

The move is framed not just as an energy play, but as a pillar of national confidence. Minister Papastavrou emphasized that these agreements bolster Greece’s economic, energetic, and geopolitical standing, effectively positioning the nation as a potential natural gas producer for both domestic and European markets.

Geopolitics and the “New Era” of Energy

The government’s strategy aims to balance sustainable development with the country’s strategic advantages. This includes heavy investment in LNG terminals, cross-border interconnections, renewables, and grid digitalization. Notably, Greece has recently transitioned into a net electricity exporter for the first time in nearly 25 years.

The major pipeline projects in the area are the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (red), the Trans- Anatolian Pipeline (orange) and the East Med pipeline (red arrows), this last currently under discussion.

Beyond the balance sheet, the entry of a global giant like Chevron carries significant geopolitical weight. Minister Papastavrou suggested that the partnership serves as a “de facto” counter-manoeuvre to the controversial maritime memorandum between Turkey and Libya, reinforcing Greece’s sovereignty and role in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Exploration Roadmap: Blocks and Timelines

The four lease agreements, which span a combined 47,000 square kilometers, are slated for parliamentary ratification next month.

Target Areas: The concessions include Lot A2 (bordering the South of Peloponnese block) and two blocks south of Crete (South of Crete 1 and 2).
Operational Schedule: Preliminary exploration activities are expected to commence in the second half of this year.
Deepwater Expertise: While monetizing deepwater resources remains capital-intensive, Chevron’s track record in technically challenging offshore environments is seen as a critical asset for the consortium.

Expanding the Footprint: Block 10 and Beyond

Industry insiders suggest the Chevron-HELLENiQ partnership may soon expand. Reports indicate the two companies are evaluating cooperation for Block 10 in the Gulf of Kyparissia. Currently held solely by HELLENiQ Energy, Block 10 borders Lot A2 and covers 2,400 square kilometers. Exploration drilling there is tentatively scheduled for the second quarter of 2028.

Greece’s offshore blocks

The strategy appears to favor the creation of large, unified exploration zones. By grouping these blocks, the consortium can manage the high costs and logistical complexities of deepwater extraction more efficiently.

Regional Upstream Activity

The broader Greek upstream sector is also gaining momentum:

ExxonMobil: Preparing for its first exploratory drilling in over 40 years, targeted for the first half of 2027.
Energean: Currently operating the Prinos, Prinos North, and Epsilon fields (Greece’s only active complex), the company is pivoting toward decarbonization. Its subsidiary, EnEarth, is progressing with plans to convert the Prinos field into a permanent carbon dioxide storage reservoir.

February 19, 2026

by AEA in News

Terna Energy Secures Environmental Approval for Major Pumped Storage Project in Northern Greece

Northern Greece is emerging as a critical hub for large-scale energy storage, with several twin pumped storage hydropower (PSH) systems moving through the regulatory pipeline. In the latest development, the Ministry of Environment and Energy has granted environmental clearance—specifically the Approval of Environmental Terms (AEPO)—for the first phase of the Vrohonera project.

The Vrohonera endeavor is being spearheaded by Terna Energy, a subsidiary of Masdar. This milestone follows closely on the heels of similar approvals granted to the Katselis family for their nearby Flampouro and Trani Vrachi twin PSH projects.

Pumped storage hydropower design

Strategic Location and Technical Specifications

Located southeast of Veria in the Imathia region of Central Macedonia, the Vrohonera complex will utilize the Agia Varvara artificial lake as its lower reservoir. This reservoir is situated on the Haliacmon (Aliakmonas) River, Greece’s longest waterway.

The project has seen significant scaling since its initial “producer certificates” were issued in 2021:

Vrohonera 1: The latest AEPO outlines a generation capacity of 450 MW via three turbines and a pumping capacity of 537 MW. This represents a substantial increase from the 2021 proposal of 401 MW and 372 MW, respectively.
Vrohonera 2: Initial proposals for the second phase included 131.5 MW in production and 217.8 MW in pumping capacity.
Storage & Efficiency: Integrated into the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) development plan, the combined Vrohonera complex is designed to provide 8 GWh of storage with an estimated cycle efficiency of 73% and an operational lifespan of 50 years.

The total investment for the Vrohonera complex is valued at €1.1 billion, with commissioning currently targeted for 2031.

Expanding the PSH Portfolio

Terna Energy’s commitment to Greek energy storage extends beyond Vrohonera. The company is currently executing several other high-stakes projects included in the ENTSO-E list:

Amfilochia: This flagship PSH plant is nearing the finish line, with completion expected within the current year.
Ladonas: A joint venture with the Public Power Corp. (PPC Group), this 220 MW generation (231 MW pumping) facility is slated for completion in 2032 and will provide 2 GWh of storage capacity.
Amari: Located on Crete, this project represents a sophisticated hybrid PSH and wind power solution, further diversifying Greece’s largest island’s energy mix.

By advancing these projects, Terna Energy and Masdar are positioning themselves as primary architects of Greece’s energy transition, providing the long-duration storage essential for a renewables-heavy grid.

February 19, 2026

by AEA in News

Corridor VIII Emerges as a Strategic Pillar for Balkan Integration and NATO Security

TIRANA — High-level officials and international stakeholders gathered in the Albanian capital this week to chart the future of Pan-European Corridor VIII, a multi-billion euro infrastructure project designed to bridge the Adriatic and Black Seas. Billed as a modern successor to the ancient Roman Via Egnatia, the corridor is increasingly viewed by regional leaders and Western allies not merely as a transport route, but as a critical component of economic sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic security.

ECONOMIC FORUM: “Strategic Connectivity and Regional Economic Growth: The Economic Potential of Corridor VIII”

The forum, titled “Strategic Interconnectivity and Regional Economic Growth: The Economic Potential of Corridor VIII,” held on February 18, 2026, served as a platform for Albania and North Macedonia to reaffirm their commitment to the project. The discussions highlighted a shift in the corridor’s narrative, moving from a long-delayed logistical ambition to a certified strategic priority.

A Security Necessity: The NATO Dimension

In a significant development for the region’s geopolitical standing, Albanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, Belinda Balluku, revealed that Corridor VIII has now received NATO certification. This designation elevates the project from a civilian transport initiative to a vital military and security asset for the alliance’s eastern flank.

“Corridor VIII is no longer just a road for the movement of goods and citizens,” Balluku stated during the forum. She characterized the project as a “safe infrastructure for Euro-Atlantic security,” noting that its completion would allow for the rapid deployment of resources between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea—a necessity brought into sharp focus by shifting security dynamics in Eastern Europe.

The certification ensures that the technical specifications of the roads and railways—connecting the port of Durrës in Albania to Varna and Burgas in Bulgaria—meet the rigorous standards required for military mobility, effectively integrating the Western Balkans into NATO’s logistical architecture.

Economic Integration and the EU Path

While security dominated the high-level briefings, the forum’s primary focus remained the economic transformation of the Balkan interior. For decades, the lack of east-west connectivity has been cited as a major bottleneck for regional trade.

ECONOMIC FORUM: “Strategic Connectivity and Regional Economic Growth: The Economic Potential of Corridor VIII”

Delina Ibrahimaj, Albania’s Minister of State for Local Government, described the corridor as a “key instrument for European integration and regional stability.” Ibrahimaj emphasized that the project is now a formal part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), a status that unlocks significant funding from the European Union.

“The development of this corridor is synonymous with the development of our economies,” Ibrahimaj noted, arguing that the project will reduce transport costs, attract foreign investment, and foster a more unified regional market. Officials at the forum suggested that by linking the ports of Albania with the industrial hubs of North Macedonia and Bulgaria, the corridor would create a “short-circuit” for trade that currently relies on longer, more congested routes.

Strengthening the Balkan Backbone

Representing North Macedonia, Igor Hoxha echoed the sentiment of regional interdependence. He framed Corridor VIII as the “backbone of regional development,” essential for the landlocked nation’s access to international maritime routes.

The cooperation between Tirana and Skopje has intensified as both nations seek to synchronize their construction timelines. The project involves a complex mix of highway expansion and the modernization of ageing railway tracks, many of which have remained dormant since the end of the Cold War.

Corridor VIII connection.

“From the Via Egnatia to Corridor VIII, the plan to connect East and West is finally making its definitive stop in Tirana,” noted reports from the forum, highlighting the historical weight of the project. By reviving this ancient trade artery, the participating nations aim to reverse a history of fragmentation and replace it with a corridor of “peace and prosperity.”

Challenges and the Road Ahead

Despite the diplomatic optimism, the path to completion remains fraught with logistical and financial hurdles. The rugged terrain of the Balkan interior requires extensive tunnelling and bridge construction, driving up costs. Furthermore, the synchronization of three different national bureaucracies—Albania, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria—remains a persistent challenge.

However, the consensus in Tirana was clear: the project has reached a point of no return. With the backing of the European Union’s Western Balkans Investment Framework and the newfound urgency of NATO’s security requirements, Corridor VIII is moving from a blueprint to a reality.

As the forum concluded, the message from the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was definitive: Corridor VIII is the strategic link that will finally anchor the Western Balkans into the broader European family, transforming the region from a “grey zone” of infrastructure into a modern hub of global connectivity.

February 18, 2026

by AEA in News

Albania National Mining Strategy 2026–2040: A Critical Assessment of Strategic Autonomy and Value Chain Integration

The release of the National Strategy for the Development of the Mining Sector 2026–2040 represents a definitive, albeit belated, attempt by the Albanian state to reconcile its socialist-era extractive legacy with the stringent requirements of the European Union’s green transition and digital agenda. As the global economy pivots toward carbon neutrality, the demand for critical raw materials (CRMs) has transformed mineral-rich nations into geopolitical pivots. Albania, positioned as a traditional producer of chromium, copper, and nickel, finds itself at a crossroads where its historical extraction-only model no longer suffices to sustain economic growth or satisfy the regulatory benchmarks of the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act. The strategy under review outlines a fifteen-year roadmap designed to modernize the industry, but its success is contingent upon overcoming structural deficiencies in human capital, environmental remediation, and institutional transparency that have plagued the sector for decades.

The Geopolitical and Strategic Imperative of the 2026–2040 Framework

The foundational logic of the 2026–2040 strategy is rooted in the “Green Deal” and the necessity of achieving strategic autonomy for the European continent. For Albania, this strategy is not merely a technical document but a primary instrument of European integration. By aligning national mining policy with Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 (the CRM Act), the Albanian government seeks to position the country as a vital node in the European supply chain for minerals essential to renewable energy technologies, electromobility, and defence. The strategy explicitly aims to transform the sector from a source of raw ore exports into an integrated industrial complex that captures high-value downstream processes such as refining and smelting within the national borders.

The evidence of Albania’s importance is underscored by its persistent global ranking in chromium production, where it consistently remains the seventh-largest producer and the fourth-largest exporter of this strategic mineral. However, the economic impact of this dominance has been mitigated by the low level of domestic processing. Historically, and continuing into the present, the vast majority of extracted ore is shipped to smelters in China and Turkey, effectively exporting the employment and fiscal benefits associated with the metallurgy stage of the value chain. The new strategy identifies this as a critical failure and sets a target to ensure that at least 30% of chromium, copper, and nickel ore is processed domestically by 2030.

Albanian Extractive Economy against Regional Neighbours

To understand the realism of these targets, a comparative analysis with Western Balkan peers is essential. While Albania’s mineral sector accounts for approximately 4.2% of its GDP, its production profile differs significantly from neighbours like Serbia and Kosovo, whose extractive industries are overwhelmingly dominated by lignite for domestic power generation.

Indicator (2023/2024 Data)	Albania	Serbia	Kosovo	North Macedonia
Minerals Production (Metric Tons)	1,379,939	33,556,191	6,930,329	4,479,894
Top Mineral Focus	Metallic (Cr, Cu, Ni)	Lignite, Copper	Lignite (5th global)	Chemicals, Ores
Processing Level (Domestic)	20–35% (Cr)	High (Integrated)	Limited	Moderate
Mining Rent (Royalties)	6–9%	Competitive	Varied	High Reform

Serbia’s mining sector, which saw a production high of over 36 million metric tons in 2022, benefits from a much more integrated industrial base, where extraction is closely linked to large-scale smelting operations like those in the Bor district. In contrast, Albania’s metallic sector has remained fragmented. The strategy acknowledges that while Albania possesses significant geological resources, it ranks lowest in the region for its business environment and institutional quality. This institutional gap is the primary reason why North Macedonia was able to increase its concession fee revenues by 218% in 2025 through tariff reform and better municipal coordination, while Albania continues to struggle with royalty collection and distribution.

Institutional Architecture and the Reform of Resource Governance

The 2026–2040 strategy identifies a critical bottleneck in the fragmented nature of Albanian mining governance. Currently, the administrative burden is distributed across the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy (MIE), the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN), and the Albanian Geological Survey (SHGJSH). This division has historically led to overlapping jurisdictions, lack of data synchronization, and delays in the permitting process. One of the strategy’s most ambitious institutional goals is the creation of a unified digital “DataHub” for mineral and geological information.

The mechanism for this reform involves the consolidation of decades of archived geological data, much of which remains in analog format, into a digital GIS platform that complies with the EU’s INSPIRE standards. The current documented situation reveals that exploration data packages are non-existent, making it difficult for international “junior” mining firms to conduct the preliminary risk assessments necessary to justify greenfield investments. The strategy’s Objective 5 aims to rectify this by providing structured access to potential investors, which is expected to reduce the current high-risk profile of the Albanian mining landscape.

Transparency and the EITI Standard

Governance is further complicated by the history of transparency in the sector. Albania’s membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 2009 has provided a platform for mitigating corruption and ensuring that the public can monitor the flow of mining rents. However, the “resource curse” remains a threat; the strategy notes that while mining rents for unprocessed metallic minerals have increased to 6–9%, the actual transfer of the 5% statutory share to local municipalities is often delayed or omitted. In 2015, only 3.6% of royalties were successfully transferred to local government units, despite legal mandates.

The roadmap for 2026–2040 explicitly ties future funding to the rigorous implementation of the 2023 EITI Standard. This includes the disclosure of beneficial ownership and the publication of detailed environmental impact data—factors that are now prerequisites for any project seeking “Strategic Project” status under the EU CRM Act. Without these governance improvements, Albania remains vulnerable to the types of high-level corruption and money laundering that have led to its placement on international “grey lists” in recent years.

Geological Potential and the Realignment of Reserve Valuation

The strategic pivot toward CRMs requires a fundamental re-evaluation of Albania’s geological endowment. The country currently manages 579 active mining licenses, but the production data from 2018–2024 reveals a problematic reliance on industrial and construction minerals. In 2018, for instance, the output of limestone for inerts reached 38 million tons, whereas metallic ore production, which offers significantly higher economic complexity and value-added potential, remained modest in comparison. This statistical imbalance threatens the long-term viability of the national reserve portfolio.

Quantitative Analysis of Known Reserves

According to the official data provided by the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN), the following metallic and strategic reserves represent the backbone of the 2026–2040 industrial ambitions:

Mineral Category	Total Reserves (Tons/Metric)	Grade/Content Analysis
Chromium Ore	31,074,927	29.93% Cr₂O₃
Copper Ore	40,250,498	1.45% Cu
Iron-Nickel	247,884,220	44.3% Fe₂O₃
Nickel Silicate	104,096,767	1.16% Ni
Titanomagnetite	78,323,738	6.01% TiO₂
Bauxite	20,029,883	42.03% Al₂O₃
Phosphorites	46,587,088	5 – 33% P₂O₅
Zinc	3,038,211	1.61% Zn

The strategy recognizes that these reserves are currently classified under outdated methodologies that do not align with international financial reporting standards. A major component of Policy 1 is the re-evaluation of at least 80% of these reserves according to the United Nations Framework Classification (UNFC) by 2030. This transition is not merely a bureaucratic requirement; it is a critical mechanism to enable international financing. European banks and institutional investors are increasingly unable to fund projects where the geological risk is not quantified via UNFC or JORC-compliant reporting.

The Potential for “Secondary Mining”

A second-order insight derived from the strategy is the government’s newfound focus on “mining waste to resources.” For decades, the byproduct of Albanian mining—billions of tons of tailings—was viewed as a purely environmental liability. However, the new strategy integrates these tailings into the circular economy framework. In regions like Rubik and Kurbnesh, historical tailings from the Cold War era contain significant concentrations of copper, zinc, and even rare earth elements (REE) that were technologically impossible or economically unfeasible to extract in the past.

The strategy sets a target to recover and valorize at least 20% of these existing sterile deposits by 2040. This is particularly relevant for chromium-rich tailings, which offer a sustainable pathway for domestic ferrochrome production without the environmental footprint of new open-pit mining. Reprocessing these legacy sites is expected to generate upwards of €500 million in revenue over the next decade while simultaneously addressing severe acid mine drainage issues.

Industrial Policy and the Diversification of the Value Chain

The current documented situation in Albania’s mineral processing is one of stagnation. While the country possesses 16 chromium enrichment factories, their capacity is underutilised due to high energy costs and a lack of modern furnace technology. Policy 2 of the 2026–2040 strategy addresses this by proposing the establishment of at least two dedicated “Mining Industrial Hubs” equipped with shared energy, logistics, and environmental infrastructure.

The Nickel-Cobalt-Copper Value Nexus

The most significant industrial project currently underway is the CVMR nickel refinery at Qafë Thanë, which signals a move toward high-purity nickel and cobalt production—essential materials for the European battery industry. The strategy aims to replicate this model in the copper sector. While 100% of copper ore is currently processed to the concentrate level within Albania, the lack of a modern domestic smelter means that the refined metal must be produced abroad.

The mechanism for achieving deeper integration involves “Strategic Projects” under the EU CRM Act. Albania intends to submit at least three projects for this designation by 2040, which would grant them “overriding public interest” status, faster permitting, and access to European investment instruments like InvestEU. This is a savvy geopolitical move, but the investigative evidence suggests that Albania faces fierce competition from Serbia’s lithium projects and Bosnia’s lead-zinc operations for these limited European funds.

Strategic Metric	2025 Status	2040 Objective	Financial & Standards Context
Domestic Cr Processing	20% – 35%	50% Integration	Transition to metallurgical-grade ferrochrome.
Recycling Rate	< 5%	+50% Vol. Increase	Focused on CRM/SR circular economy.
UNFC Evaluation	< 10%	100%	Standardization for EU investor confidence.
EU Strategic Projects	0	3 Projects	Alignment with the Critical Raw Materials Act.
Total Strategy Budget	—	€181 Million	Covers technological modernization & R&D.

Safety, Environmental Sustainability, and the ESG Burden

One of the strategy’s most sobering admissions is the state of workplace safety and environmental degradation. In 2024, the mining and quarrying sector accounted for 12% of all accidents and 9% of all fatalities in Albania, with the majority occurring in the underground chromium mines of Bulqizë. The current mechanism for safety inspection—the National Authority for Safety and Emergencies in Mines (AKSEM)—is underfunded and lacks the digital tools necessary for real-time monitoring of gas concentrations, ventilation, and geotechnical stability.

The strategy proposes a radical shift: mandating the installation of real-time digital monitoring systems in all underground mines by 2040. However, for the hundreds of small-scale license holders who currently operate on thin margins, the cost of these systems is prohibitive. This suggests that the strategy will realistically achieve its safety goals only through the consolidation of smaller units into larger, more capitalised entities—a move that carries social risks in communities that rely on artisanal and small-scale mining for survival.

The €100 Million Rehabilitation Liability

The environmental debt of the Albanian mining sector is staggering. Approximately 4.1 square kilometres of territory are documented as severely contaminated by heavy metals and acid mine drainage. The World Bank estimates that the cost of full recovery for these sites exceeds €100 million. To address this, the strategy proposes the creation of a National Fund for the Rehabilitation of Mining Areas (Fondi Kombëtar i Rehabilitimit) by 2026.

The efficacy of this fund remains questionable. Currently, rehabilitation is funded through individual bank guarantees, which are often insufficient and managed in a decentralized, opaque manner. Centralizing these funds is a necessary step, but without an immediate injection of international donor capital, the government will struggle to address legacy sites in Rubik and Përrenjas that have no current owner to hold liable. The integration of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by the EU adds further pressure; Albanian exports will soon face carbon taxes if they cannot prove their production processes are reaching decarbonization targets.

The Human Capital Crisis and the Technological Generation Gap

Perhaps the most significant threat to the achievability of the 2026–2040 strategy is the collapse of the domestic technical workforce. The data indicate a catastrophic decline in the number of students pursuing degrees in geology and mining engineering. Since the 1990s, enrollment at the Faculty of Geology and Mining has dropped by over 80%, with fewer than 50 students registered in the 2025-2026 academic year. This has created a vacuum where the median age of the expert workforce is rapidly rising, and there are virtually no young specialists trained in the “high-tech” mining techniques required by the strategy—such as AI-driven sorting, airborne surveys, or hydro-metallurgy.

The strategy responds with Policy 4, which outlines a “Mineral Brain Gain” program and the creation of a National Training Center for CRMs. While these are sound objectives, they are set against a demographic backdrop of extreme youth outmigration. Albania saw a net migration of -24,472 in 2024 alone. To attract diaspora specialists back to the mines of Martanesh or Bulqizë, the government must offer more than just a patriotic appeal; it must create a professional ecosystem that rivals the salaries and career stability found in the EU.

Fiscal Analysis and the Reality of Option II

The 2026–2040 strategy is costed according to two options, with the government selecting “Option II”—the more ambitious “Variant of Need”. This option carries a total indicative cost of 19,466,891,000 ALL (approximately €181 million) over the fifteen-year period.

Detailed Budgetary Allocation (Option II) (Source: Compiled from Section 9 of the Strategy Report. )

Strategic Policy	Total Cost (Million ALL)	Total Cost (Million Euro)	State Budget %	IPA/Donor %
Policy 1: Extraction & Assessment	4,609.9	42.9	40%	60%
Policy 2: Modernization & Recycling	7,573.4	70.4	35%	65%
Policy 3: Safety & Environment	3,292.8	30.6	45%	55%
Policy 4: Human Capital	2,634.2	24.5	50%	50%
Policy 5: Data & Transparency	1,356.6	12.6	30%	70%
Total Strategy	19,466.9	~181.1	~40%	~60%

The investigative scrutiny of this budget reveals a heavy reliance on external funding. Approximately 60% of the €181 million is expected to come from EU IPA III funds, Horizon Europe, and international financial institutions like the EBRD. The state budget is only expected to cover about €11 million per year—a significant increase from the historical average of €5.1 million, but still a fraction of the total need. This “funding gap” represents a massive risk. If the global economic outlook slows, as projected by the World Bank for 2026, or if EU accession progress stalls, Albania could find its mining strategy severely underfunded.

The Energy-Price Risk Factor

A critical omission in the fiscal analysis is the cost of energy for domestic processing. Modern refineries for nickel and copper are highly energy-intensive. Albania is over-reliant on hydropower (over 90% of domestic production), which is susceptible to climate-induced droughts. High electricity prices have historically forced Albanian ferrochrome smelters to suspend production during peak winter months. Unless the strategy is integrated with a renewable energy expansion specifically for mining hubs (such as on-site solar and wind), the 30% domestic processing target will likely remain a documented ambition rather than a realistic achievement.

Market Forecasts and the Commodity Price Trap

The realistic success of Albania’s mining strategy is deeply tethered to the “Pink Sheet” commodity forecasts of the World Bank. The current outlook for the primary Albanian minerals is a mix of high demand and volatile pricing.

Copper: Poised to reach new nominal record highs by 2026-2027 due to its non-negotiable role in clean-energy infrastructure. This supports the strategy’s goal of expanding the Mirditë copper operations.
Nickel and Cobalt: While essential for EV batteries, these minerals face supply chain pressures and fluctuating demand from the Chinese property sector. The success of the Qafë Thanë refinery depends on capturing the European market, which is increasingly seeking “clean” nickel not tainted by the environmental practices common in Indonesian production.
Chromium: As the global steel industry attempts to decarbonize, the demand for high-grade ferrochrome (produced with low-carbon energy) will command a premium. This presents a unique opportunity for Albania to leverage its hydro-based grid as a competitive advantage.

However, the strategy must navigate a “downside” scenario. If global growth—particularly in China—slows more than expected, the prices for base metals will collapse, rendering Albania’s high-cost, small-scale underground mines uneconomical. The strategy’s lack of a fiscal stabilization fund or a sovereign wealth mechanism to buffer against these cycles is a notable weakness.

Realistic Achievability vs. Documented Ambition

The Strategjia Kombëtare për Zhvillimin e Sektorit Minerar 2026–2040 is a theoretically robust document that identifies the correct strategic pillars for a 21st-century extractive industry. Its alignment with the EU CRM Act is a masterstroke of policy integration that will likely secure substantial pre-accession funding. However, based on the current documented situation, the following conclusions emerge regarding its realistic achievability:

Governance and Transparency: This is the most achievable pillar. The technical capacity for a GIS DataHub exists, and the EITI framework is already well-integrated into the Albanian institutional fabric. By 2030, Albania will likely have a transparent, digital licensing regime that significantly reduces corruption risks.
Processing and Value Addition: The target of 30% domestic processing is achievable for chromium but highly unlikely for copper without massive state intervention in the energy market. The “Mining Industrial Hubs” are feasible only if Albania can solve its seasonal energy shortages.
Environmental Remediation: The strategy will likely succeed in launching three “showcase” rehabilitation projects using World Bank or IPA funds, but the total €100 million liability will remain a shadow over the sector for the duration of the fifteen-year period.
Human Capital: This is the strategy’s “Achilles’ heel.” There is no evidence that a “Brain Gain” program can reverse a 30-year demographic trend. Unless geology and mining engineering are treated as national priority disciplines with guaranteed elite-level salaries, the industry will face a terminal expertise shortage by 2040.

In final assessment, the strategy marks the end of the “wild west” era of Albanian mining. It transitions the sector into a structured, EU-compliant industrial framework. While it may not achieve its most ambitious processing and recycling targets due to energy and labor constraints, it will succeed in locking Albania into the European strategic supply chain, ensuring that the country’s mineral wealth remains a central component of its national security and economic identity for the next generation.

February 18, 2026

by AEA in News

Scatec Secures €121M Financing to Build 189.7 MW Solar Portfolio in Romania

The Scatec has reached financial close for a 189.7 MW photovoltaic portfolio in Romania, enabling the company to commence construction on the three-site project. Most of the planned capacity—in which Defic Globe is a minority shareholder—is covered by contracts-for-difference (CfDs).

A financing package led by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Banca Comercială Română (BCR) — part of the Erste Group — underpins the development of the Romanian solar portfolio. Equinor, the Norwegian energy company, is the largest shareholder in Scatec. Total capital expenditure for the portfolio is EUR 121 million, to be financed through a mix of non-recourse project debt and equity with roughly 70% leverage.

EBRD and the EIB each allocated EUR 34 million to the financing, while BCR committed EUR 17.3 million in long-term lending alongside other financing components. Scatec said it will procure key components representing about 35% of total capex and will assume responsibility for operations, maintenance and asset management. The company reported a target commercial-operation date in the second half of 2027.

“Reaching financial close and starting construction of our first projects in Romania confirms the market’s attractiveness and the strength of the CfD framework,” said Terje Pilskog. “With long-term revenue visibility and a robust financing structure, the projects are well positioned for construction and delivery. We look forward to advancing them with our partner Defic Globe and contributing to Romania’s energy transition.”

Scatec secured 15-year CfD contracts covering 70% of production for two of the three projects under the country’s first auction for such contracts; the remaining output will be sold in the wholesale market. The sites are located in southern Romania: one in the commune of Dobrun commune, Olt County, Romania and another in the commune of Sadova commune, Dolj County, Romania. CfD-backed capacity totals 127.8 MW, with a further 61.9 MW planned to operate under full merchant exposure, according to the EBRD.

Defic Globe — a joint venture owned by YEO Technology (51%) and Emsolt Investments — holds a 35% stake in the portfolio and has been appointed to deliver turnkey engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) services. The project companies are registered as Solar World, RB Solar Energy and Energie Soleil.

Listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, Scatec now has 6.2 GW of capacity in operation and under construction across five continents.

February 18, 2026

by AEA in News

U.S. Energy Secretary Warns IEA: Prioritize Energy Security or Face U.S. Exit

Chris Wright urged the International Energy Agency to prioritize energy security over advocacy for the deployment of renewables, and warned that the United States could withdraw from the body if it does not change course. The remarks, delivered at a conference in Paris, accused the agency of acting like a “climate advocacy organization” and dismissed the value of a global net-zero scenario as unrealistic.

The intervention, which Politico reported as signalling growing tension between Washington and the IEA, frames a broader disagreement between the agency’s modelling of low-carbon transitions and the current U.S. administration’s pro-fossil-fuel orientation. Politico covered Wright’s comments and the administration’s stance.

Chris Wright

Wright argued that when international data and analysis bodies devote resources to what he characterised as “leftist fantasies,” they risk undermining their core mission of delivering objective analysis for energy security and market stability. He warned that continued emphasis on net-zero scenarios could prompt a reevaluation of U.S. membership in the IEA.

Those remarks echo positions voiced by other senior U.S. officials. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Howard Lutnick criticised European solar and wind deployment and questioned the desirability of pursuing net-zero policies, urging instead greater reliance on oil, gas and even coal. World Economic Forum meetings in Davos gathered these high-profile exchanges.

Observers note that the rhetoric follows a wider shift in U.S. climate and energy policy since the current administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord earlier this year, a move that has intensified transatlantic debate over the pace and direction of the energy transition. Donald Trump has publicly criticised Europe’s renewables push and framed the U.S. approach as a deliberate return to fossil-fuel development.

The clash poses a practical challenge for the IEA, whose forward-looking scenarios and data are widely used by governments and markets. How the agency responds — whether by adjusting emphasis, defending its analytical frameworks, or engaging in political dialogue with member states — will shape its role in an era of sharply divergent energy strategies.

February 18, 2026

by AEA in News

Croatia Launches Espoo Convention Procedure Over Gornji Horizonti Hydropower Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Green Transition has formally initiated proceedings under the Espoo Convention concerning the Gornji Horizonti hydropower subsystem in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The large-scale energy project предусматриes the construction of three hydropower plants.

Environment Minister Marija Vučković confirmed that the official procedure was launched in November through the Secretariat of the Espoo Convention, formally known as the UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. Both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are signatories to the convention.

According to Vučković, the ministry issued a written opinion arguing that the project’s development has not complied with provisions related to the participation of potentially affected states in projects with possible cross-border environmental impacts. While Croatia does not have the authority to block such infrastructure investments, it is entitled to be adequately consulted and to receive comprehensive responses to its inquiries.

Longstanding Environmental Concerns

Vučković emphasized that energy infrastructure development in the Trebišnjica river basin has, for decades, produced visible adverse effects in the Neretva river valley. She noted that numerous expert questions raised by Croatian authorities over the past 15 years — ranging from the HPP Dabar project to subsequent initiatives — remain unresolved.

“In the spirit of good-neighborly relations, Croatia will continue to insist on clear and substantiated answers,” the minister stated.

The Prefect of Dubrovnik-Neretva County, Blaž Pezo, warned that the Gornji Horizonti project poses a risk to the natural freshwater flow of the Neretva River. He underscored that Croatia is actively pursuing all available mechanisms to challenge aspects of the project that could negatively affect its territory.

Ministry of Environmental Protection and Green Transition

Parallel Investment to Combat Salinity in Lower Neretva

The issue was discussed in Opuzen during a visit by Vučković and Pezo to the site of a EUR 85.5 million environmental protection project in the Donja Neretva region. The initiative aims to safeguard land and water resources from salinization in the lower Neretva area.

The first phase foresees the construction of a barrier on the Neretva River to prevent seawater intrusion, with works valued at approximately EUR 30 million and an implementation timeline of four years. The second phase includes the development of a freshwater reservoir upstream of the barrier, intended to flush salt from agricultural soils and secure reliable irrigation supplies.

Structure of the Gornji Horizonti Subsystem

The Gornji Horizonti hydropower subsystem involves diverting water from the Gatačko (Gacko) and Nevesinjsko (Nevesinje) plains through the Dabarsko (Dabar) and Fatničko (Fatnica) plains into Bilećko (Bileća) Lake.

The project encompasses three hydropower plants — Dabar, Bileća and Nevesinje — and is being developed by Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske. Construction of the Dabar hydropower plant is currently underway.

February 17, 2026

by AEA in News

DAPEEP Study Signals Strong Revenue Prospects for Greece’s First Standalone Battery Projects

Standalone battery projects in Greece poised for strong revenues, says Operator of Renewable Energy Sources & Guarantees of Origin (DAPEEP), Greece, battery storage, DAPEEP, energy storage, balancing market, wholesale market, grid services, auctions, investors, 700 MW, 4.7 GW

Greece’s first standalone battery storage installations are projected to generate substantial revenues when they enter commercial operation, according to a new study by DAPEEP.

The study modelled several scenarios; its principal case assumes revenues 75% above the baseline. Under that scenario, two-hour systems running for the full year of 2026 could earn about EUR 157,057 per MW annually. Four-hour systems are estimated to yield EUR 100,885 per MW per year, although those units are expected to commence operations in the second half of 2026.

Although the projected figures assume continuous operation through 2026, the report notes they are theoretical: the earliest standalone batteries are expected to reach commercial operation from late spring. A number of installations have already been built and are awaiting final regulatory clearance. Investors have expressed frustration at delays, warning that prolonged idle time can degrade battery performance and reduce capacity.

The initial tranche from the country’s three auctions will deliver roughly 700 MW by late in the first half of 2026, DAPEEP says, followed in subsequent years by an additional 4.7 GW of unsubsidised capacity.

DAPEEP highlights a dual revenue model for standalone storage. Operating income will be derived partly from the wholesale electricity market and partly from the balancing market. The difference between minimum and maximum hourly prices in the wholesale market is identified as the principal profit driver, while balancing services provide a complementary revenue stream and system-stabilising value.

In the early phase, day-ahead and intraday trading are expected to account for roughly 65% of revenues; that share is forecast to decline to about 40% later in the year as market dynamics evolve. DAPEEP anticipates that wholesale revenues will be resilient to the initial influx of projects, but cautions that the balancing market will be more sensitive to the additional standalone storage capacity.

The study’s findings underline the commercial potential of battery storage in Greece while also highlighting operational and market-integration challenges that policymakers, regulators and investors will need to resolve to realise that potential.

February 17, 2026

by AEA in News

Croatia Confirms Fourth Geothermal Discovery Near Zaprešić, Marking 100% Exploration Success

Geothermal Reservoir Confirmed near Zaprešić; Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency (AZU) Reports Four-for-Four Exploration Success, geothermal, Croatia, district heating, energy independence, exploration

The Croatian Hydrocarbon Agency (AZU) has completed exploration activities at all four sites under the project Preparation and Exploration of Geothermal Potential in the Context of Centralized Heating, confirming substantial geothermal resources near Zaprešić. This site is the fourth positive discovery following successful exploration campaigns in Velika Gorica, Osijek and Vinkovci.

AZU President Marijan Krpan said the agency achieved a 100% success rate at the planned locations, delivering maximum project effectiveness and demonstrating full operational capability. He emphasized that the results validate the agency’s technical expertise and ability to execute complex subsurface exploration and resource assessment, and noted ambitions to export that expertise internationally.

Independent analysis has also pointed to strong national potential: a recent study by think tank Ember outlined significant geothermal prospects across Croatia.

Temperature and geology at Zaprešić
Exploration near Zaprešić — in Zagreb County — confirmed a geothermal reservoir primarily developed in dolomitic formations at depths exceeding 1,600 metres, with measured temperatures above 95 °C. The work in the area included two-dimensional seismic surveys, magnetotelluric measurements and the drilling and testing of an exploratory well; the site had been the least well-documented by prior geophysical and borehole data.

“Just two months ago we announced the start of works on a project of exceptional importance for our citizens and economy. I am pleased that today we can confirm positive results, creating the prerequisites for a step toward sustainable and long-term solutions for our community,” said Mayor Željko Turk.

Historic milestones for national heating capacity
AZU described the cumulative findings in the Pannonian region as historic for Croatia’s energy independence. In June, exploration near Velika Gorica recorded reservoir temperatures exceeding 100 °C; subsequent analyses indicated the source could supply nearly 60% of a local district-heating system’s demand. The investment in that site exceeded EUR 11 million.

In August, a site near Osijek also yielded temperatures above 100 °C with an estimated capacity close to 5 MW; that programme, valued at more than EUR 8 million, has been presented as an opportunity to support local agricultural and broader economic development.

Late last year, exploration in Vinkovci returned a record temperature of 131 °C at a depth of 2,700 metres, a result that AZU described as offering exceptional commercial potential for district heating and industrial applications.

Project funding and implementation
The exploration programme is financed under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), with a total allocation of EUR 50.8 million. Drilling and field operations were carried out by Crosco, a contractor within the INA Group.

Current state of geothermal power in Croatia
Despite the renewed momentum in exploration, Croatia presently has no active geothermal power plants. The Velika 1 facility in Velika 1 plant (Ciglena, near Bjelovar) has been out of operation for three years owing to an ownership dispute, underscoring a gap between resource discovery and commercial generation that authorities and investors will need to address to translate these exploration successes into operational capacity.

February 17, 2026

by AEA in News

Albania’s Solar Gold Rush: Who Profits, Who Pays?

As Albania races to become a net exporter of electricity, dozens of vast solar parks have sprouted almost overnight on fertile farmland and pastures, igniting fierce resistance from local communities. In Fier’s village of Boçovë, a normally quiet farming district near the Seman delta, families woke one day to find heavy machinery digging up fields they had tended for generations. “It turned out a photovoltaic park was being built here, and our lands aren’t ours anymore,” complained Nikoll Ndoi, a local schoolteacher. Ndoi and his neighbours say they gained these plots in the early 1990s under Albania’s land-reform law (Law 7501), but were never issued legal titles and now discover the state has quietly expropriated them for solar panels. More than a dozen families in Boçovë are locked in a fight to reclaim their soil from a new small company, “Brevi Construction”, where it is mentioned in the media that it is affiliated with the family of Pëllumb Salillari. Such clashes are multiplying nationwide as the government greenlights hundreds of megawatts of solar capacity, prompting farmers and herders to denounce an “energy revolution” that is trampling their rights and livelihoods.

Residents of the Levan Administrative Unit protested again in the village of Boçova, after work began on their agricultural lands to install photovoltaic panels by the company “Brevi Construction”, with administrator Afërdita Salillari.

The Albanian government, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, has made a dramatic pivot from its traditional hydropower surplus to a sun‑driven future. Since 2018, the Council of Ministers approved dozens of solar park projects and the energy regulator (ERE) licensed over 70 private solar companies. The planned PVs are a total of nearly 1,000 MW, about 30% of Albania’s installed capacity and none of it is guaranteed for local use. Instead, most is slated for export to Italy and beyond. Ex-director of Energy Policies at Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy Gjergj Simaku warns this is a “paradox”: Albania could end up exporting clean power while continuing to import fossil‑fuel electricity during winter. Simaku notes that 1 GW projects have no obligation to sell domestically, leaving local grids and consumers sidelined. Notably, Simaku does not address his own role during his long tenure at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy, where he was directly involved in shaping and implementing national energy policies. The governance gaps and regulatory weaknesses he now criticizes were also evident during the wave of small hydropower plant licensing over the past decade—a period marked by widespread concessions, limited oversight, and significant social and environmental consequences for local communities. The current tensions surrounding large-scale solar development bear striking similarities to that earlier expansion, raising questions about institutional continuity and accountability in Albania’s energy policymaking.

Municipal Public Assets Leased by Purpose of Use 2015 – 2024 (in hectares)

This policy u‑turn was codified in 2023 when the government amended the renewables law to allow solar farms on any land even vital grazing areas not just barren terrain. Green activists point out that at least half of Albania’s solar license rush is on former public pastures and forests. A recent survey by the All Green Center found many lease auctions were rushed, with no real competition or community input. “Support for green energy must not come at the expense of natural capital,” says environmentalist Ola Mitre. Birding expert Taulant Bino adds that multiple solar projects have been approved piecemeal, ignoring their cumulative impact on biodiversity. In fertile districts like Fier, dozens of solar parks now ring protected river deltas and migratory corridors. Normally one of Europe’s greenest electricity producers (90% hydro), Albania’s renewable expansion is outpacing environmental safeguards.

Locals report no meaningful consultations. In Boçovë, villagers say a developer quietly re‑zoned their family farms (marked on cadastral maps as “arable” or “forest”) into “unused state land” just as construction began. When the community complained to the Cadastre and Agriculture Ministry, nothing was fixed. In Darzezë (nearby Boçovë), elders who believed promised benefits (new roads, lighting) are now “disappointed,” saying “nothing was done, and they even took our water”. The local mayor’s office in Fier readily absolved itself of responsibility: “These projects aren’t licensed by local government,” Fier’s municipal response notes, adding only that it receives property taxes and nothing else. In effect, powerless villagers have found themselves squeezed: the state offers no legal recourse when it simply rents out “public” pastures to private developers.

A protest by residents of the village of Imshte in the Bubullimë unit in Lushnje.

Across the southwest, similar scenes played out. Last month in Imshtë (Lushnjë), about 70 farmers blocked the road to their police station, demanding authorities halt a planned solar park on 100 hectares they have grazed and farmed for 30 years. They accuse a local businessman, Elton Çekrezi, of quietly buying up the plot once officially designated as non‑transferable state land and forming a shell company SunXpower to install PV panels. MP Erion Braçe, who supports the Imshtë community, blasted the episode on social media as a “robbery of public land” by a clandestine “new agha,” warning that his supporters had been threatened during clashes with men bearing weapons. (Çekrezi’s family insists the land was legally bought at auction from former private owners, and they hold cadaster documents dating back to 1945 and 1998.) In Levan (Fier), villagers of Boçovë protested similarly when the company Bervi Construction began clearing fields they had cultivated for “almost 30 years”. Fourteen families, granted plots under the 1990s land law, but their claims were ignored, and now official records abruptly list the land under Brevi’s name. Farmers like Sandër Mujo have even petitioned prosecutors and the anti‑corruption SPAK agency, warning they will resort to self-vendication if the state does not intervene.

In August 2025, around 40 sheep farmers in Çërravë (Pogradec) held a rally after the local council moved to lease their one communal pasture (35.5 ha) to a solar investor. They decried the measure as a “direct violation of our livelihood” and threatened escalating protests if it proceeded. Independent councillor Arbër Male warned that the vote was a foregone conclusion with the beneficiary company “pre‑selected” by insiders. Such frustrations highlight a growing fear: that the clean‑energy drive is being hijacked by politically connected interests at the expense of ordinary Albanians.

A protest in the village of Çërrava, in the municipality of Pogradec

Critics say the evidence of cronyism is hard to dismiss. The Boçovë solar park was nominally awarded to “Albania Solar Power” (a tiny firm with €100,000 capital) owned by businessman Engjëll Agalliu yet locals see it as Pëllumb Salillari’s project in disguise. Likewise, in Imshtë a construction firm once run by Salillari is tied to Çekrezi’s land deal. Journalist investigations have exposed how clusters of permits went to companies tied to a few elite families, often without competitive bidding. (For example, four solar firms controlled by Armand Lilo’s relatives won megawatt‑scale licenses after a brief ministerial review.) The torrent of approvals has largely skipped formal auctions: as energy expert Simaku notes, “auctions have been forgotten; now licenses are given only on the free market, sold to us as if for domestic use but it’s not true”. NGOs also complain that municipalities have merely rubber‑stamped solar leases, lacking clear strategic planning on where solar parks are appropriate. All Green Center warns that so far, zero hectares of new PV forest have a strategic environmental assessment or master plan to guide them.

A protest in the village of Çërrava, in the municipality of Pogradec

Defenders of the solar boom argue Albania urgently needs a new generation after recent blackouts. The government’s National Energy Plan targets 54.4% renewables by 2030, so big solar projects are deemed necessary for “energy sovereignty”. Prime Minister Rama’s infrastructure ministry underscores that thousands of hectares of mostly unproductive land are available for lease; the projects will create green jobs and revenues. Indeed, Albania’s solar push aligns with EU climate goals and avoids new dams (and displacements) for hydropower. Statisticians note that in the past 10 years Albanian municipalities have leased about 6,350 hectares of public land for all purposes, with over a third (2,325 ha) of that just in 2024 mostly for solar parks. In total some 3,750 ha of state land are now contracted for renewable energy projects. Energy Minister Belinda Balluku, who is under investigation by SPAK, insists each plant needed both a Council of Ministers decision and technical approvals and that “everything is lawful, with environmental studies in place,” though she has not publicly addressed the growing protests.

Photovoltaic power plant in Kolonjë, residents in protest

Nevertheless, the ethical question remains stark. Who really benefits from this boom? Many locals answer: not them. Herders point out that solar panels are theoretically compatible with grazing (the technology allows it), yet companies invariably fence off and occupy the land outright. In Kolonjë, villagers say the developer (Turkish firm Fortis Energy & Construction) even redrew cadastral boundaries to claim around 400 hectares of steep pasture and riverbed (“zall”) that herders need for winter grazing. “If they put up panels, our village will have to leave,” one farmer warned, noting the man behind the project quietly acquired neighbouring plots over decades. Such tensions raise hard choices about property rights and the state’s role in declaring some lands sacrosanct for community use or not.

Protest against PV installation by local communities

For now, many communities are calling for moratoria. Simaku and other analysts urge a strategic pause: map out priority corridors for solar (avoiding protected zones), require genuine public auctions and participatory planning, and bind new plants to domestic needs. Environmentalists warn that Albania’s decades‑old tradition of hydropower should not be cynically traded for a different form of energy dependence. “We risk exporting renewable energy and importing coal,” Simaku says. If that happens, the country may have allowed a green transition to line the pockets of the connected few rather than serve its people’s interests.

In the heated debate over Albania’s clean‑energy path, one thing is clear: expansion of renewables cannot be at the unchecked expense of farming communities. Without transparent governance and respect for local livelihoods, each new solar panel risks deepening rural distrust. Some farmers now speak of taking their case all the way to the European courts. Whether Albania’s solar revolution will shine on as a model of sustainability or become a catalyst for social unrest may hinge on whose voices are heeded in the fields, the villagers who till the earth, or the energy “czars” behind the grid.