The Asphalt Mirage: Corruption, Catastrophe, and the Cost of Albania’s Infrastructure

The investigation into Albania’s infrastructure sector reveals a systemic pattern where corrupt procurement, tailored tendering, and political nepotism directly cause structural failures and environmental catastrophes. Evidence suggests that billions in public funds are funnelled to a narrow circle of contractors through inflated contracts and non-transparent amendments, leaving a trail of collapsed bridges, sinking highways, and devastated river ecosystems. 

The Infrastructure Investment Boom: A Macroeconomic Mirage

Albania has recently undergone an unprecedented phase of capital expenditure, centered primarily on the expansion of its national road network and the modernization of urban infrastructure. This boom, however, has been built upon a foundation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and concessionary models that international financial institutions have repeatedly criticized for their lack of transparency and high fiscal risk. The mechanism of “unsolicited proposals” has effectively allowed private entities to dictate the government’s investment priorities, often resulting in projects that serve political interests rather than economic necessity.

The scale of this spending is vast, with the 2024 budget alone showing a projected increase in PPP contract payments from 13.1 billion ALL to 14.3 billion ALL. These payments are increasingly detached from physical progress; in several high-profile cases, the state continues to remunerate contractors for projects that are years past their delivery dates or which have suffered catastrophic structural failures before completion. The Department of State and the IMF have noted that these contracts are frequently awarded without genuine competition, a trend that has fostered a culture of impunity among politically connected companies.

The Librazhd–Prrenjas Collapse and Southeast Paralysis

The national road linking Librazhd to Prrenjas — a vital segment of Corridor VIII and the primary connection between Albania’s interior and the southeast — suffered a catastrophic collapse in mid-February 2026 that consigned the axis to full blockade for days. The collapse occurred near Arrat e Gurrës, where heavy rainfall, ground instability and riverbed pressure combined with ongoing works on the corridor.

Environmental and infrastructure failure:

• Authorities and local media report that traffic on the Librazhd–Prrenjas national road was completely blocked, with only emergency vehicles allowed on the scene after a large landslide destabilised the carriageway.

• A bridge immediately adjacent to the collapsed section reportedly continued to sink and shift even days after the initial failure measurements indicating an additional ~7 cm vertical displacement in a single morning — raising fears of full structural failure.

• Alternative routes, such as the Maliq–Lozhan–Moglicë–Gramsh axis, were also impacted by secondary landslides blocking traffic and stranding motorists for 12 hours.

• Gravel (inert) extraction deepens the channel and destabilises banks. Several academic and NGO reports and local investigative pieces  document how removal of gravels lowers the bed level, increases the river’s erosive power and causes lateral migration of the channel. For the Shkumbin and Vjosa basins, case studies and expert commentaries describe a direct linkage between large-scale extraction and increased flood and erosion risk.
  

  Shkumbin river bank

• Diverting small branches or altering floodplains without hydrological re-design undermines resilience. Journalistic reporting from Elbasan/Librazhd shows road alignments moved small tributaries and branches; experts quoted in coverage warned that ad hoc diversions, if not modelled, change sediment loads and scouring patterns downstream. An analysis by Citizens.al quotes hydrology and environmental experts who called the interventions “alarming.”
• Inadequate protective works / as-built gaps. The World Bank / ARRSH environmental & social management documents for bridge and road resilience emphasize dikes, cross-drainage and designed retention structures. KLSH audits and field reporting noted that in several cases what was built on the ground did not match the originally planned protections, or supervision contracts were weak — a recipe for early degradation under flood conditions.

Local response and ongoing crisis:

A rural alternative rural road via Spathar–Antike Egnatia–Dardhë–Hotolisht quickly became the main lifeline for crossing to the southeast Albania after the collapse. However, heavy traffic revealed severe structural degradation on that route as well, with potholes, cracks and failing pavements undermining its reliability. Local users threatened to block the road unless urgent repairs were undertaken by responsible institutions.

Companies and works implicated:

The Librazhd–Prrenjas axis, before its collapse, was under maintenance and partial expansion activity by ANK sh.p.k.  the same company involved in other Corridor VIII lots while maintenance was previously under 2T sh.p.k.. Media accounts underscore that works were ongoing when the collapse occurred.

Journalistic field reporting described dredgers and heavy machinery operating in the Shkumbin River channel adjacent to the failed section even after the collapse, with interviews and video suggesting continuing erosion of the riverbed at that location.

The collapse effectively paralysed southeast Albania, halting passenger and freight transport for multiple days, forcing detours via less suitable rural roads, and incurring substantial economic disruption for cross-regional traffic. Emergency services, including ambulances and fire brigades, were at times not permitted to pass the blocked section due to safety concerns.

As of late February 2026 no official procurement or contractor statement responding specifically to the collapse had been widely disseminated in public reporting, though journalists repeatedly referenced previous tender histories and alleged links with political actors  , highlighting the need for direct replies from contractors and state agencies.

Qukës — Qafë Plloçë (Elbasan–Pogradec corridor) — long delays, amendments, maintenance tenders and infrastructure distress

A long-running mountain route linking Qukës to Qafë Plloçë, completed only after more than a decade of start–stop works and repeated contracts. It was presented as a major connectivity project when parts were inaugurated in 2025.

Procurement records & audits (selected):

• ARRSH listings show “Mirëmbajtje me performancë e segmentit rrugor Qukës – Qafë Plloçë” (reference entries) with 2T sh.p.k. named as a winner for a maintenance contract (value reported ~29,359,200 ALL). Open procurement entries list the supervision and maintenance tenders with reference numbers (for example REF-62907-09-29-2025 for a supervision/maintenance notice).

• The Supreme Audit (KLSH) produced a final audit report specifically on the Qukës–Qafë Plloçë road project; that audit documented contract delays, unconcluded milestones, and questionable contract modifications extending execution and funding beyond original schedules. The KLSH report is explicit: long time-lags, repeated addenda and inadequately justified time extensions.
• Some lots were repeatedly modified and re-tendered, or winners were allowed to execute extensive “complementary” work after the original award. Journalists and auditors flagged the granting of addenda and follow-on maintenance tenders shortly after the road’s inauguration, raising questions about whether the original contract fully reflected the works required.

Technical failures & environmental consequences: within weeks of completion and inauguration, local journalists and watchdogs reported early settlement, need for new maintenance tenders, and concerns about whether river-bank protection and drainage had been implemented according to design — in other words: observed performance problems consistent with inadequate soil stabilization and river works in mountainous terrain. Expert commentary (below) links insufficient river protection and gravel extraction to downstream erosion risk.

Community impact & institutional posture: residents and local activists complained about recurring closures and the need for extra maintenance; ARRSH has issued routine statements saying the road is in operation and that maintenance tenders are normal post-completion actions. Auditors and watchdogs call those repeated tenders a sign of procurement and planning weakness.

The Rruga e Arbrit and the Murriz Tunnel Crisis

The Rruga e Arbrit (Arbri Road) was envisioned as a strategic corridor linking the capital, Tirana, with the eastern Dibër region and the border with North Macedonia. Instead, it has become the most prominent example of how geological negligence and financial expansionism coexist within Albanian public works. The project, which was initially promised to be completed by April 2021, remains a work in progress, mired in technical failures and escalating costs. 

The Murriz Tunnel Structural Failure

The primary bottleneck of the Arbri Road is the Murriz Tunnel. Technical assessments indicate that the choice of the tunnel’s path was made with insufficient geological data, leading to encounters with highly unstable soil and fragmented rock formations. As the contractor, Gjoka Konstruksion, attempted to drill through the mountain, the structure began to shift, threatening total collapse. 

Despite attempts to reinforce the tunnel with heavy piling and reinforced concrete, the movement remained uncontrollable. This led to a drastic and expensive pivot: the abandonment of the original path in favor of “Alternativa B,” a new tunnel bypass constructed in a different geological zone. This technical failure was not borne by the contractor but by the taxpayers, with the government approving an additional 20 million Euro payment to cover the redesign and new construction.

Financial Expansion through Secondary Tenders

The Arbri Road project demonstrates a sophisticated method of cost inflation known as the “secondary tender” or “revitalization” scheme. Once the initial PPP contract valued at approximately 40.3 billion ALL was locked in, the government began issuing secondary contracts to the same contractor for works that should have been covered by the original project’s risk assessment.

Specifically, a tender for the “revitalization of slopes” was awarded to Gjoka Konstruksion shpk, effectively serving as an addendum to the original contract. This mechanism allowed the project’s annual cost to rise from 2.8 billion ALL to 3.5 billion ALL in the 2024 budget. Critics argue that these “slope revitalization” works are merely a way to pay for repairs caused by the contractor’s own poor engineering and lack of environmental safeguards during the initial excavation.

The Korçë-Ersekë Highway and the Qafa e Qarrit Collapse

If the Arbri Road represents chronic failure, the Korçë-Ersekë highway represents acute disaster. In February 2024, a massive section of the newly built road at Qafa e Qarrit-Mollas collapsed into a deep ravine, leaving the asphalt suspended in mid-air. The collapse occurred on Loti 2, Part 1, a segment that had been touted as a masterpiece of modern engineering but which failed before its official inauguration. 

Procurement Irregularities and Political Connectivity

The contract for the construction of Loti 2 was awarded to A.N.K. sh.p.k., a company owned by Agim Kola. Investigative media have highlighted that Agim Kola is the brother of Ndue Kola, a former Member of Parliament for the ruling Socialist Party. The tendering process for this project (ID: REF-21837-03-11-2022) exhibited classic “red flag” symptoms: four companies participated, but three were disqualified for minor technicalities, leaving A.N.K. as the sole bidder with an offer just 0.03% below the government’s fund limit.  

The project’s costs have grown exponentially. What was originally discussed as a 1 million Euro per kilometre project eventually reached 5 million Euro per kilometre for specific segments. Despite this massive investment, the structural integrity of the road was compromised by what engineers describe as a “falsified project” that failed to account for soil drainage and the weight of the fill materials.   

The Role of the Project Supervisor

A&E Engineering shpk, owned by Entela Çano, was tasked with both designing and supervising the works on the Korçë-Ersekë road. This dual role created an inherent conflict of interest; the firm responsible for ensuring the quality of the construction was the same firm that had authored the potentially flawed design. SPAK has since taken Entela Çano and several officials from the Korçë and Kolonjë municipalities as defendants, alleging that they certified fictitious or substandard works that directly led to the collapse.

Unaza e Madhe and the “DH Albania” Scandal

The Tirana Outer Ring project, known as Unaza e Madhe, is perhaps the most egregious example of how the Albanian infrastructure sector has been exploited by “ghost” entities. The project’s cost, averaging 15 million Euro per kilometer is widely considered the highest in the region for a road of its class.   

Forgery and Institutional Failure

The scandal surrounding “DH Albania” exposed a profound lack of oversight within the Albanian Road Authority (ARRSH). In 2018, it was discovered that this company had secured an 18 million Euro contract for a segment of the ring road using forged documents from the Secretary of State in Delaware, USA. The documents falsely claimed the company had years of experience and significant capital, allowing it to bypass the vetting process. The fact that such a blatant forgery was accepted by the Ministry of Infrastructure suggested that the “checks and balances” were being bypassed by design rather than by error. 

Predetermined Tendering and Tailored Equipment

The procurement for Unaza e Madhe has frequently been characterized by “tailored criteria.” In one notable instance, a tender required participants to have a 450-ton crane in their inventory. Experts noted that such a crane was entirely unnecessary for the urban roadwork required, but its inclusion served as a mechanism to disqualify any firm that did not have that specific, rare piece of equipment, effectively narrowing the field to one or two favoured companies.  

Further investigations by SPAK into “Loti 4” of the ring road have focused on the communications of Evis Berberi, the former head of ARRSH. Messages retrieved from his phone allegedly show that the winners of these multi-million euro tenders were decided in private meetings long before the official bidding process began. 

Environmental Analysis: River Diversions and Infrastructure Destabilization

The degradation of Albania’s infrastructure cannot be separated from the unchecked manipulation of its river systems. To lower costs and maximize profits, contractors frequently divert rivers to facilitate road construction or to provide a convenient source of free aggregate materials (gravel and sand). These actions, often taken without valid Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), have catastrophic consequences for both the environment and the infrastructure itself.

The Erzen River and the Sukth Flood Pattern

The Erzen River has been subject to numerous “embankment reinforcement” projects that have ultimately failed during peak rainfall. In the administrative units of Sukth and Katund i Ri, the river has repeatedly breached its banks, not due to the volume of water alone, but due to the poor quality of the man-made embankments.   

Investigative reports have documented cases where contractors, hired to build flood defenses, instead used the opportunity to dredge the riverbed, undermining the very banks they were paid to protect. When the embankments fail, the resulting floods do more than destroy crops; they cause road subsidence and the “scouring” of bridge foundations, creating a feedback loop of infrastructure destruction and emergency repair spending.  

Illegal Road Works in Protected Ecosystems

The case of the Mayor of Tropoja, Rexh Byberi, illustrates a broader trend of “rogue” infrastructure projects. SPAK’s investigation found that several road projects in the Tropoja region, including the “Palç-Guri i Lules” and “Qafë Murrizi-Qafë Agri” segments, were conducted in total violation of environmental laws. These projects lacked environmental impact reports and were initiated without the mandatory coordination with the National Environment Agency. The resulting landslides and erosion have not only damaged the new roads but have also permanently altered the hydrology of the surrounding slopes.

The Procurement “Red Flag” Framework

A systematic review of the Albanian public procurement database reveals a consistent set of “red flags” that characterize high-risk infrastructure contracts. These mechanisms are designed to maintain a facade of legality while ensuring that the outcome of a tender is predetermined.

1. The Disqualification Tactic

The most common indicator of a rigged tender in Albania is the disqualification of all bidders except one. Often, these bidders are disqualified for failing to submit a single, non-essential document. This allows the remaining firm the pre-selected winner to secure the contract with a bid that is within 0.01% of the government’s maximum fund limit.   

2. The Use of Shell Companies and “Ghost” Partners

As seen with “DH Albania,” the use of offshore entities or newly formed shell companies allows the real owners (often political figures or their relatives) to shield themselves from public scrutiny.  

3. Systematic Addenda and “Unexpected” Costs

Contracts are frequently modified shortly after being signed. In the case of the Korçë-Ersekë road, a modification was approved for “project revisions” and “taban improvement” just months after the initial award, adding over 432 million ALL to the price tag. This is often used to circumvent the initial “fund limit” of the tender.

Tuneli i Llogarasë (Orikum–Himarë / SH8) — supervision contract, disputed procedures and a SPAK probe

Construction of a new Llogara tunnel as part of the SH8 coastal route. The works included an important supervision services contract (fee-based oversight of tunnelling works).

Procurement record (key facts): the supervision tender was issued with a ceiling (fund limit) of 196,240,667 ALL (approx. €1.6–2.0m depending on exchange) under REF REF-12982-11-24-2021; the winner announced was the joint offer Hill International N.V. & NetGroup sh.p.k., with a reported winning value of 194,700,000 ALL. Open procurement records list the tender and the reference number.

Media reporting and documents obtained by prosecutors say the tender’s selection criteria were allegedly adjusted in ways that narrowed the field (for example, lowering experience thresholds in some steps), and that lower monetary bids were disqualified on technical grounds. Investigative articles cite messages and evidence later seized in the SPAK probe.

SPAK opened an investigation into the tender and into a broader set of contracts connected to the same officials; the dossier includes seized documents from the winning supervision firm. Prosecutors have charged several officials linked with road authority decision-making. The public prosecution statements and extensive reporting show criminal inquiries are active.

Technical / environmental consequences: reporting raised questions about the quality and independent oversight of the tunnelling works, and whether supervision met the standard expected for a high-risk mountain tunnel. Local technical correspondence cited in reporting suggests site inspectors flagged deviations. At the time of writing SPAK’s indictments and the technical inspection reports remain the primary sources to verify whether any design or execution defects caused safety issues; these are part of the court file.

Community impact & official response: the tunnel was inaugurated and put into operation; nonetheless, the SPAK investigation and media reports prompted public debate about whether procurement shortcuts and the supervision contract’s selection undermined safety and value for money. The Ministry/ARRSH have provided routine project updates while SPAK holds the criminal file.

The destruction and structural failure of Albania’s infrastructure are not isolated technical errors; they are the physical manifestations of a compromised procurement system. The evidence demonstrates a clear causal chain: tailored tenders lead to the selection of incompetent but politically connected contractors; these contractors, in turn, bypass environmental and engineering standards to maximize profit; and the resulting infrastructure—built on shifting soil and forged documentation inevitably collapses under the first pressure of nature.

The financial toll on the Albanian taxpayer is immense, with billions of ALL locked into 30-year PPP commitments for roads that may not survive a decade. Furthermore, the environmental damage—ranging from altered riverbeds to decimated forests represents a permanent loss for the nation. Until the “red flag” mechanisms of procurement are addressed through radical transparency and the removal of the “unsolicited proposal” loophole, Albania’s infrastructure will continue to be a façade of modernity masking a hollow core of systemic corruption.